The Three Decisions

On Sunday, Colombians went to the polls to vote in the legislative elections, and the results are far more telling than most people believe. Much was said prior to election day about how it would change the political landscape. The results of the inter-party primaries would directly reshape the presidential race, and the legislative results would give us a clear view of the country’s public opinion. But beyond affecting the political panorama, the elections left us with winners, losers, and three decisions that Colombians made for the next four years. Who were the losers? Who were the winners? What decisions do the election results reveal?

First decision: The dominant force in the country, by a wide margin, is Petrismo.

After the elections it became clear that the big winner of the day was Petrismo. Exceeding the expectations of many analysts, Pacto Histórico secured an overwhelming 4.5 million votes for the Senate. This allowed it to consolidate itself as the largest bloc, with a total of 25 seats. The natural wear and tear in public opinion that affects the party in government in many elections around the world did not affect the president.

Despite the major corruption scandals of his administration, the poor management of healthcare and the state’s finances, and the widespread chaos within his cabinet, Gustavo Petro achieved a resounding victory in the elections. Four years ago, even many circles on the left were worried about the idea of a Constituent Assembly. Today those fears slide off the Teflon coating that seems to cover the president, and the votes continue to pour in. Petro can do or say whatever he wants; so far he has proven to be immune to scandals and to poor governance.

Second decision: The center does not exist.

If these elections make anything clear, it is that in Colombia people vote in only four ways: for Petro, against Petro, for Uribe, or against Uribe. Everything else simply does not exist. Evidence of this can be seen in the results of both the primaries and the legislative elections. On the side of the primaries are two of Sunday’s big losers: Claudia López, from the center, and Roy Barreras, who calls himself center-left. Even though both won their respective primaries, the results leave much to be desired. Reality ended up weighing more than optimistic calculations and angry complaints about the polls.

Roy Barreras sought to challenge Iván Cepeda for leadership of the left. Claudia López tried to prove she was a viable candidate and to take the center away from Sergio Fajardo. Both failed resoundingly. Neither the imaginary 3 million votes Roy claimed to have nor the supposed massive turnout in Claudia’s primary ever materialized. Of the 21 million people who went out to vote, less than 3% voted in each of these primaries. Now Claudia and Roy are condemned to run in the first round, destined to fail and knowing there is nothing they can do about it.

As for the legislative elections, the only parties that grew are those at the extremes. Only Pacto Histórico, Centro Democrático and Salvación Nacional saw significant increases compared to 2022. The Senate results show us a society even more polarized than four years ago, where the extremes carry increasing weight and where the few centrist voters are forced to choose a side in order to settle for the lesser of two evils.

Third decision: Governability guaranteed.

The third decision made by Colombians is the most peculiar. Despite the intense climate of polarization, whoever reaches the presidency will have the opportunity to build majorities and govern. This may seem counterintuitive, but it makes perfect sense within the Colombian political context. How is it possible that, if there is so much division, majorities can still be achieved regardless of who wins? The answer is simple. Even taking into account the previous decision, the nonexistence of the center, there are three types of blocs in the Senate.

First are the blocs that blindly follow Petro, made up of Pacto Histórico, the indigenous parties, and part of the Green Alliance. Second are the blocs that oppose Petro, made up of Centro Democrático, Salvación Nacional, Mira, and Cambio Radical. And finally there are the “budget blocs,” whose ideology is always flexible depending on who holds power and controls the money. Here we find a large part of the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Party of the U, and the rest of the Green Alliance. With the significant growth of both extremes, it is now these flexible seats that will have the final say. Since everything will depend on who manages the budget, whoever wins the presidency will have the possibility of building majorities, as long as they know how to negotiate.