Referendum by Decree

On May 14th, following the Senate's rejection of the proposed referendum, the government was left significantly weakened. It’s likely they had pinned all their hopes on the project, which may explain why Armando Benedetti, completely unhinged, was shouting and flailing his arms in front of the Senate’s Secretary General, while María José Pizarro stepped in between them, trying to reason with Benedetti. One has to admit that at least Benedetti stayed true to the government’s usual way of reacting to any obstacle: creating a scandal while playing the victim.

This is why we shouldn’t be surprised by the recent presidential address, in which President Gustavo Petro authoritarianly declared that he would proceed with the referendum by decree, disregarding the legislature’s decision. This also fits within the trademark style of “Petrismo”: if it doesn’t work through proper channels, then it will be forced through improper ones. How does Petro justify his decision to decree the referendum? What consequences might it bring? Why is he doing this?

As the government has gotten us used to, we are once again witnessing a clash between the branches of power. On one side, the president argues that the Senate vote was invalid. In his address, he said that “there was never a favorable ruling from the Senate… they cheated.” The government’s lawyers claim the vote should be considered void. Some of their legal arguments include that the text was not read during the session, that the vote ended abruptly, that an appeal to repeat the vote was ignored, and that a mistake in recording one of the votes was not properly addressed.

On the other side are the senators and several legal scholars, who argue that the Constitution clearly states that a national referendum must be submitted to the Senate and voted on there, that all official Senate channels certified the vote as valid, that there is no time limit for Senate votes, that voting is always at the discretion of the presiding chair, and that the senator whose vote was misrecorded repeatedly affirmed that he had voted “no.”

But beyond the fine print and legal technicalities, when a dispute arises between two branches of power—in this case, the executive and legislative—it is the judiciary that must resolve it. The president does not have the authority to impose a referendum by decree and only later have it reviewed by the courts. Judges must first determine whether the Senate vote was legal or not before the president can go parading around in a mermaid costume and push it through by decree. These are the moments when the courts must demonstrate their independence and stand firm against this presidential decree.

It’s in acts like this where the president’s hypocrisy shines. Gustavo Petro labels any disagreement with his views—a worldview he sees as needing to be hegemonic—as a “coup.” It is Petro himself who calls judges, senators, journalists, public figures, and opposition party members “coup plotters” whenever he fails to get his way. And yet, it is he who engages in the most undemocratic and authoritarian behavior. Once again, he shows us that he has a martyr complex, persecuted by a system he has himself undermined.

However, beyond this distorted perception of reality and his ongoing authoritarian behavior, Gustavo Petro has significant reasons for announcing his decree now. First, the government has taken a hit following the Senate’s rejection of the referendum and the failure of the strikes Petro tried to mobilize. This creates a need to reunify his electoral base ahead of the 2026 elections. The fight over the referendum is the perfect excuse to energize the thousands of disillusioned Petro supporters who have grown frustrated with his disastrous administration. It’s a way of reinforcing the narrative that none of this is Petro’s fault—that the real problem is that they won’t let him govern.

Second, the referendum serves as a strategic smokescreen, conveniently announced at the same time that a group of key officials close to Petro are being indicted on corruption charges. Ricardo Bonilla, Petro’s former minister, and Cesar Manrique, former Director of the Public Function, have been charged with influence peddling and unlawful interest in government contracts in the case of the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD). Carlos Ramón González, former Presidential Administrative Director, is accused of inflating contract costs and then bribing congress members to push the government’s reforms. And the cherry on top: Ricardo Roa, Petro’s 2022 campaign manager and current president of Ecopetrol, is under investigation for a conflict of interest. Petro has a lot to cover up—the smokescreen must be massive. It must hide a governance crisis, a string of indicted officials, and the ongoing institutional breakdown the president is fueling. Without a doubt, Gustavo Petro needed a smokescreen the size of an unconstitutional, decreed referendum.